Lis pendens: Proposed reform and the High Court weighs in on tactical use to block receiver property sales

Introduction

As the Government announces a potentially substantial reform of the law on the registration of lis pendens relating to land, the Irish High Court has delivered a timely judgment in Goldstein Property ICAV v RELM Loan Opportunities 2 DAC & Ors [2026] IEHC 29 developing the current state of the law on lis pendens in disputes concerning the validity of receiver appointments.

What is a lis pendens?

A lis pendens is a burden registered against land which is the subject of litigation, for the ostensible purpose of putting prospective purchasers on notice of that litigation. Section 121 (2) (a) of the Land and Conveyancing Law Reform Act 2009 (the Act) provides that a lis pendens may only be registered to record the existence of litigation concerning an interest in land, but, in practice, there is no scrutiny of the underlying claim at registration. As a result, a lis pendens can remain registered as a burden on title for years without a court ever considering the basis or merit of the underlying proceedings. The device can therefore operate as a de facto injunction on sales by receivers or others and is often used to frustrate or delay disposals.

Proposed reform

The General Scheme of the Civil Reform Bill 2025 (the General Scheme) was published on 6 January 2026 and sets out proposals for sweeping civil reform in the Irish Courts (see further here). Head 29 of the General Scheme proposes limiting the term of a lis pendens. Under the proposal:

1. A lis pendens will be automatically vacated 28 days after it is registered unless the registering party obtains a court order to have the lis pendens extended.
2. Once a court decides not to extend a lis pendens, it will not be possible to re-register.
3. An affected party can apply to have the lis pendens vacated where (i) the relevant litigation has been discontinued or determined; or (ii) where the court is satisfied that there has been unreasonable delay in prosecuting the claim or where the claim is not being prosecuted bona fide.

If enacted, this provision will introduce welcome reform and should have the effect of reducing the ability of parties to use litigation to abuse the system of registration of lis pendens.  While we await the publication of the draft Civil Reform Bill, it is instructive to consider a recent decision of Mr Justice Twomey in the High Court relating to the registration of lis pendens in the context of litigation concerning the validity of receiver appointments. 

High Court judgment: Goldstein Property ICAV -v- RELM Loan Opportunities 2 DAC & Ors

Background

The first to third defendants (RELM) advanced a loan of €150m (the Loan) to the Plaintiff (Goldstein) which was secured over a portfolio of 47 commercial properties (the Secured Properties). The Loan was not discharged by the final repayment date and six weeks later, RELM issued final demands and then, in November 2024, appointed the fourth and fifth defendants as receivers over the Secured Properties (the Receivers).

Goldstein issued proceedings (the Proceedings) challenging the validity of the appointment of the Receivers and registered a lis pendens against the Secured Properties. Goldstein alleged that RELM had represented that a further extension to the repayment date would be granted and, on that basis, claimed the terms of the Loan had not been breached and that RELM was not entitled to appoint the Receivers.

RELM issued a motion to strike out the Proceedings as bound to fail and sought an order vacating the lis pendens on the basis that it was not registerable. RELM claimed that the lis pendens had been registered by Goldstein to (1) prevent the sale of the Secured Properties by the Receivers; and (2) try to force RELM to accept re-financing terms.

Key issues: lis pendens

While various issues were considered in the judgment, this article focuses on the key issues for determination in the application to vacate the lis pendens namely whether the Proceedings constituted a claim concerning “an estate or interest in land”, and whether a lis pendens can be vacated where proceedings are not being prosecuted bona fides.

A receiver is entitled and authorised to transfer land to a third party, but it does not own the land so there is a question as to whether a challenge to a receiver’s appointment could give rise to an entitlement to register a lis pendens. This issue has divided opinions in the High Court in actions challenging the appointment of receivers: In Fay & Anor -v- Promontoria (Oyster) DAC & Anor [2022] IEHC 483, the High Court permitted the registration of a lis pendens taking the view that it is “arguable” that this type of litigation concerns an interest in land. The court reached the opposite conclusion in Moorview Developments Ltd [2011] 1 IR 117 holding that a receiver does not own any interest in land and only has a contractual right to cause the landowner to transfer title and on that basis vacated a lis pendens over a corporate borrower’s property.  

Decision

Having considered previous conflicting interpretations of section 121 (2) (a), the Court concluded that it was entitled to make its own assessment and ultimately preferred the narrower interpretation taken in Moorview. Notably, the Court acknowledged that the interpretation will ultimately be subject of a decision of the appellate courts given the divergence of opinions in the High Court, whether in the Proceedings or in another case.

Finding in favour of RELM, the Court made an order vacating the lis pendens, holding that receivers do not have, and their role does not create, an interest in land. Rather, a receiver simply has a contractual right to transfer the interest of a borrower. Therefore, litigation against a receiver, even a challenge to the validity of their appointment, does not involve a claim to an interest in land and cannot ground a lis pendens.

In reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that such a claim is indirectly a claim which concerns an interest in land, which may ultimately affect the title of the land. The Court observed that the proper remedy in such a scenario would be an injunction to restrain the sale of the land by the receiver. Such an application would require a borrower to convince a court of the merits of its claims concerning the appointment of the receiver. The Court noted that it is the simple act of instituting proceedings (which allows for the registration of a lis pendens), rather than the merits of the claim, which leads to an effective injunction on the sale of the land when a lis pendens is registered. In the Court’s view, this supports the narrower interpretation of section 121(2)(a) of the Act preferred in Moorview

In its judgment, the Court provided several helpful examples of litigation which would not be considered to relate to an interest in land and therefore, would not be registerable as a lis pendens:

1. Litigation in respect of a receiver’s ability to act i.e. litigation regarding a receiver’s bankruptcy and thus disqualification from acting as a receiver, would not be a claim made to an interest in land and not registerable as a lis pendens.
2. Litigation taken against a director, where it is claimed that the director was not validly appointed, is also not registerable as a lis pendens. While a director may be authorised to transfer the company’s land in the company’s name, the director has no interest in the land.
3. Litigation concerning the mental capacity of a person appointed under power of attorney to transfer land, would not be a claim to an interest in land and would not be registerable as an interest in land.

RELM argued in the alternative that the Proceedings were not prosecuted bona fide, pointing to the eight‑month delay in challenging the appointment of the Receivers and alleged use of the lis pendens as leverage for refinancing. Although the Court had already decided to vacate the lis pendens on other grounds, the Court did consider this alternative argument, finding that although Goldstein’s substantive claim was weak, it was not satisfied on the facts that the case was prosecuted with mala fides, and indicated that it would not have vacated the lis pendens on that basis alone.

Commentary: current state of the law

The decision in Goldstein lends support to existing High Court authority narrowing the scope for using lis pendens in receiver appointment disputes. Although obiter, Twomey’s comments and examples of litigation which would not be considered to relate to an interest in land may be of assistance to future litigants seeking to challenge the registration of lis pendens as a burden. 

It remains to be seen whether the appellate courts will adopt the narrower Moorview interpretation, or whether it will remain possible for litigants to register a lis pendens as a burden on title in cases where the validity of the appointment of a receiver is being challenged. It may be that registration applications will continue to be accepted in line with Fay and then subject to challenge on a case-by-case basis by way of application to vacate the registration of a lis pendens.

For now, at least, the guidance in Goldstein is that a borrower who seeks to stop a receiver sale should pursue injunctive relief and meet the usual equitable tests, rather than relying on the automatic effect of registration of a lis pendens.

Commercially, the decision may reduce execution risk for enforcement and distressed transactions by limiting tactical registrations that can freeze marketing processes and depress values.

Conclusion

While Goldstein provides some practical guidance today, the proposed statutory reforms promise to curtail delay‑based tactics in the future, improving pricing and execution across Irish property-related enforcement and distressed asset sales.

If the Civil Reform Bill is enacted as proposed, the 28‑day automatic vacatur and the limits on re‑registration should effectively deter misuse of lis pendens and accelerate deal timetables. That should enhance certainty for lenders, receivers and investors, while preserving court supervision where a claimant can demonstrate a credible case and obtain an injunction.

For further information on this topic, please contact Cecelia Joyce, Senior Associate, Amie Creaton, Solicitor, Sinéad Hayes, Practice Development Consultant, or your usual A&L Goodbody Disputes team contact.

Date published: 12 February 2026