Quasi-judicial bodies in Ireland: Process, standards and reform

Lessons from Hegarty v Revenue Commissioners [2026] IEHC 59

Introduction

ireland's quasi-judicial bodies which include statutory tribunals, regulators, professional disciplinary bodies and departmental adjudicators now play a central role in determining a broad range of disputes, imposing sanctions and providing final determinations of rights and obligations across employment, tax, financial services, housing, data protection and professional regulation. While the commonly used term "quasi-judicial" is descriptive rather than statutory, constitutionally, the key question is whether a body administers justice within the meaning of Article 34 of the Constitution or exercises limited functions and powers of a judicial nature permitted under Article 37.1.

The recent High Court decision in Hegarty v Revenue Commissioners [2026] IEHC 59 provides a timely illustration of why proceedings before these bodies must be treated as substantive adjudication and why the procedural and legal standards applied by quasi-judicial decision-makers are subject to rigorous appellate scrutiny. In that case, the High Court overturned a determination of the Tax Appeals Commission (the TAC), not because the Court disagreed with the TAC's conclusion, but because the process by which the TAC reached its determination was legally deficient so  the resulting decision could not stand.

The decision in Hegarty v Revenue Commissioners

The case concerned an appeal by way of Case Stated (a procedure by which specific questions of law are referred to the High Court for an opinion ) from a TAC determination that certain transactions involving Gilt Forward Contracts and Foreign Exchange Contracts for Difference constituted "tax avoidance transactions" within the meaning of section 811 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (the TCA). The TAC had found in favour of the Revenue Commissioners, concluding that the taxpayers had procured a "tax advantage" and that the transactions resulted in a misuse of section 31 TCA 1997.

In his judgment, Quinn J. emphasised that the role of the High Court on a Case Stated is not to "step into the shoes" of the TAC and form its own opinion on whether the transactions amounted to tax avoidance. Rather, the Court's function is to advise on the specific points of law raised. The judgment should not be construed as representing a different opinion to the TAC under section 811; the Court did not seek to reconsider the evidence or redo the TAC's exercise.

Nevertheless, the Court identified a series of material errors of law that went to the core of the TAC's determination, rendering it unsustainable. These errors included:

• Misinterpretation of expert evidence

The TAC concluded that the Revenue's expert was "unwilling to agree" that the transactions could be characterised as hedging. However, the transcript of the TAC hearing demonstrated that on at least four occasions, the Revenue's expert had in fact accepted that characterisation. The Court held that this finding was unsustainable on the facts and amounted to a conclusion that no reasonable Appeal Commissioner could draw, applying the principles in Mara v Hummingbird [1982] ILRM 421.

• Failure to give adequate reasons

Even if the TAC were entitled to depart from the evidence of both experts on the hedging point, the Court held that clear reasons were required for doing so. Applying the principles in Stanberry Investments Limited v Commissioner of Valuation [2020] IECA 33 and Donegal Investment Group plc v Danbywiske & Ors [2017] IESC 14, the absence of reasoned engagement with the decision to prefer one expert over the other constituted a separate error of law. Indeed, the TAC could have decided to discount the evidence of both experts, but in that situation would similarly have had to provide reasons for that approach.

• Misallocation of the burden of proof

The TAC had concluded that there was a "positive obligation" on the taxpayers to demonstrate that there was no misuse or abuse of the relief provisions. The Court, following the Court of Appeal decision in Hanrahan v Revenue Commissioners [2024] IECA 113, held that this was an error of law: the correct application of section 811(3)(a)(ii) requires an objective assessment of the law and cannot be swayed by a consideration of who bears the burden.

• Deficient statutory interpretation

The TAC had failed to apply the statutory interpretation methodology required by the caselaw, in particular the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Heather Hill v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IESC 43. There was no proper purposive analysis of the relevant relief provisions, sections 31 and 607 TCA 1997, and the TAC's subjective reasoning that the transactions "could not have been envisaged by the Oireachtas" was held to be an incorrect approach to statutory interpretation, permitting the decision-maker to substitute a subjective view for the established methodology.

These errors had a "domino effect" and each compounded the next, fatally undermining the TAC's substantive conclusion that the transactions constituted tax avoidance. The High Court found that the determination could not stand and remitted the case to the TAC.

Quasi-judicial bodies in Ireland: the broader landscape

The Hegarty decision is best understood in the context of the wider ecosystem of quasi-judicial bodies in Ireland, which has evolved incrementally and without a single legislative framework. The system received a pivotal constitutional endorsement, and set of constraints, in Zalewski v. Workplace Relations Commission & ors [2021] IESC 24, where the Supreme Court confirmed that many such bodies do administer justice but may do so constitutionally under Article 37 provided their jurisdiction is limited and full standards of justice are observed. Further detail on the implications of the Zalewski judgment can be found in our insight. While Hegarty may not carry the same constitutional significance for the TAC as Zalewski did for the WRC, it does follow a recent trend whereby litigants are asking the Courts to scrutinise the decisions of non-judicial adjudicative bodies under the framework set out in that judgment.

The Hegarty case can be contrasted with the outcome in Hamill v Revenue Commissioners [2025] IEHC 627, where Quinn J. declined to find that the TAC had erred in law in admitting evidence obtained from third parties, noting that the taxpayer had himself refused to cooperate with Revenue’s information-gathering process and that the documents were available to the taxpayer in any event. The case underscores that procedural fairness is a two-way obligation: the quality of a party’s own engagement may determine the viability of a procedural challenge on appeal. Similarly, the Supreme Court’s decision in Seán Flaherty v Revenue Commissioners [2026] IESC 4 demonstrates the other side of the coin: where the TAC’s reasoning is legally sound, the courts will uphold its determination. In that case, the TAC’s determination was upheld through four successive tiers of decision-making: the Tax Appeals Commission, the High Court, the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. Together, these decisions confirm that the courts’ willingness to intervene is context-specific: robust reasoning and correct application of the law will attract deference, but procedural or legal deficiency will not.

The principal categories of determinative quasi-judicial bodies are as follows:

• Constitutional tribunals including the Workplace Relations Commission, the Labour Court, the Residential Tenancies Board and the Tax Appeals Commission are established by primary legislation to resolve defined categories of dispute. They hear evidence, issue binding determinations, and may make monetary awards, compliance orders and grant statutory remedies such as reinstatement. Appeals generally lie to the High Court on a point of law or to a specialist appellate body.
   
• Regulatory decision-makers with adjudicative functions such as the Central Bank of Ireland (Administrative Sanctions Procedure), the Data Protection Commission, Coimisiún na Meán, ComReg and the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman (FSPO) are empowered to make findings of statutory breach or maladministration, impose monetary penalties, and issue compliance directions or disqualification orders. Their decisions can have punitive or deterrent effects and, depending on the circumstances, are subject to appeal to a statutory tribunal, the High Court or the Circuit Court, as well as judicial review.
   
• Professional disciplinary bodies including the Legal Services Regulatory Authority, the Medical Council and the Teaching Council make determinations that directly affect livelihood and professional standing. Sanctions frequently require confirmation by the High Court and decisions may be subject to judicial review.
   
• Administrative adjudicators within departments such as appeals officers in immigration, social protection and statutory compensation schemes finally determine statutory rights or entitlements. They operate with statutory independence in decision-making and are subject to defined appeal mechanisms.

Across all categories, bodies exercising adjudicative powers must meet full constitutional standards of justice, including independence and impartiality, fair procedures, openness, andwhere credibility is at issue, evidence on oath and cross-examination. Specialist expertise attracts a degree of curial deference, but as Hegarty demonstrates that deference does not displace legal or constitutional scrutiny and cannot compensate for a failure to provide a properly reasoned decision or errors of fact.

Reform outlook

The fragmented nature of the current system is now the subject of a significant reform initiative. The Law Reform Commission (LRC) has published a Consultation Paper on the Reform of Non-Court Adjudicative Bodies and Appeals to Courts (LRC CP 70-2025), with the consultation closing on 23 June 2026. The consultation examines whether a framework statute should govern adjudicative bodies, the harmonisation of core procedural protections across sectors, structural independence and appointments, and the establishment of clearer and more coherent appeal structures without losing the benefits of such bodies which include flexibility, speed and cost-effectiveness.

In parallel, sector-specific post-Zalewski amendments continue across employment law, regulatory sanctions regimes and disciplinary systems, focused on compliance with constitutional justice requirements. One such example is the Financial Services and Pensions Ombudsman (Amendment) Act 2025, which amends the existing legislative framework to ensure that the FSPO can continue to carry out its statutory functions in accordance with the Constitution. Those amendments include provision for the examination of witnesses, for the facility to hold hearings in public and clarification of the definition of ‘financial service provider’ to ensure that certain groups of persons are not precluded from accessing the services of the FSPO. Further details of these amendments can be found in this ALG article.

Key takeaways

Quasi-judicial bodies should be engaged with as substantive adjudicators, not as informal administrators, regardless of their processes. The principle of curial deference (i.e., the courts’ deference to the decisions of quasi-judicial bodies) operates such that decisions are frequently binding and enforceable, reputationally significant, and difficult to overturn once factual findings have been made.

The Hegarty decision reinforces several practical points for clients who may be subject to proceedings before the TAC or other quasi-judicial bodies.

1. First, the quality of the decision-making process matters as much as the outcome: a determination may be overturned not because the conclusion is wrong, but because the route by which it was reached is legally deficient.
2. Second, quasi-judicial decision-makers are held to the same standards of reasoned analysis, proper treatment of evidence and correct application of the law as the courts. While curial deference means that a court should be slow to interfere with a specialist body’s reasoning on matters within its expertise, it is not a “supercharged presumption of validity”. Deference does not apply to questions of law or where there are errors of fact.
3. Third, early, legally robust engagement with quasi-judicial processes is essential, as the quality of the evidential record and submissions at first instance directly shapes the scope for appellate scrutiny. In the case of Hegarty, access to the transcript of the hearing before the TAC was central to the decision of the High Court to overturn the determination.

The LRC recommendations that emerge following this consultation are likely to shape medium-term reform across multiple sectors, and we will continue to monitor case law and legislative developments as they emerge.

For more information, please contact Stephen Egan, partner, Cecelia Joyce, senior associate, Rachel Malone, solicitor, Sinéad Hayes, senior practice development consultant, or your usual contact in the Tax or Disputes teams.

Date published: 27 May 2026